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The emergence of new infections and resurgence of old onesFhealth threats stemming from
environmental contamination or purposeful acts of bioterrorismFcall for a worldwide effort in
improving early outbreak detection, with the goal of ameliorating current and future risks. In
some cases, the problem of outbreak detection is logistically straightforward and mathematically
easy: a single case of a disease of great concern can constitute an outbreak. However, for the vast
majority of maladies, a simple analytical solution does not exist. Furthermore, each step in
developing reliable, sensitive, effective surveillance systems demonstrates enormous complex-
ities in the transmission, manifestation, detection, and control of emerging health threats. In this
communication, we explore potential future innovations in early outbreak detection systems
that can overcome the pitfalls of current surveillance. We believe that modern advances in
assembling data, techniques for collating and processing information, and technology that
enables integrated analysis will facilitate a new paradigm in outbreak definition and detection.
We anticipate that moving forward in this direction will provide the highly desired sensitivity and
specificity in early detection required to meet the emerging challenges of global disease surveillance.
We cannot create observers by saying ‘observe,’ but by
giving them the power and the means for this observation
and these means are procured through education of the
senses.
Maria Montessori
Introduction: Three main challenges in outbreak
detection
Failure of biosurveillance systems to detect incipient out-
breaks at the earliest stages of spreading infection can lead
to otherwise avoidable increases in the incidence of and
mortality from a disease, whether that disease results from
environmental contamination, exposure to zoonotic patho-
gens, or purposeful acts of bioterrorism. Many different
mathematical and statistical techniques have therefore been
proposed
1,2 to analyse incoming disease incidence reports
and detect a signal that is distinct from the unavoidable noise
as early as possible after the onset of any event. However,
the possibilities are far from exhausted and we have not yet
developed a demonstrably reliable early detection method.
The availability of better methods will invariably lead to
enhanced biosecurity and help government, policy makers,
and safety professionals in general to provide more effective
strategies to ensure public health and safety.
For some diseases of greatest concern, the problem of
outbreak detection is mathematically easy: a single case can
constitute an outbreak (for example, smallpox), and for
diseases for which this is the case, our efforts are geared
towards early biological detection and identification of the
single case, rather than mathematically or statistically
identifying an impending epidemic. However, for the vast
majority of diseases, including those responsible for frequent
and/or periodic epidemics and severe mortality (for example,
influenza, which claims B36000 lives a year in the
United States under normal, non-epidemic conditions
3),
our concern in biosurveillance and outbreak detection is
rather focused on finding ways to detect unusual patterns of
disease incidence soon after they begin to break from what
is expected, typical, or endemic. This brings us to our first
challenge in modern biosurveillance: the definition of ‘an
outbreak’. A large part of the effort for a number of diseases is
already spent in making the decision of what constitutes an
unusual pattern.
4 Most modern disease surveillance systems
rely on static thresholds for outbreak detection. Outbreaks
are declared once a sufficient number of new cases are
reported over a certain period of time, within the confines of
a certain location. The determination of these thresholds
(that is, how many cases, over how long a period of time,
within how much space) relies on historical incidence data
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approach is instantly problematic when the disease of
concern has never been observed within the population at
risk, which means that no baseline can be established;
however, it also poses other challenges. No two outbreaks are
ever identical, even once corrections are made for popula-
tion size, demography, and preexisting protective immunity.
Similarly, endemic (or non-outbreak) disease occurrence can
fluctuate for a variety of reasons (for example, known
seasonal patterns). This means that there are large challenges
involved in both determining what is normal and determin-
ing what is unusual. Methods from the fields of operations
research and traditional statistics have helped somewhat,
although the usual goal in operations research is to detect
an event exceeding the ‘3 sigma’ threshold of detection,
based on the likelihood and frequency of the occurrence.
5–7
In biosurveillance, however, the likelihood and frequency of
an event of interest are not actually determinants of concern.
Even if local outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome
or Ebola haemorrhagic fever became frequent, and even
expected, it would still be a logical requirement of any
biosurveillance system to detect these events as soon as
possible.
Some more sensitive methods (compared with a fixed
threshold approach) for outbreak detection have proposed
the use of adaptive thresholds, incorporating information on
patterns in disease incidence over some past units of time, as
well as the current scenario, to determine whether observed
patterns of incidence signal an incipient outbreak.
5,8 These
methods, however, involve complications of their own: not
only are historical data needed for both outbreak and
nonoutbreak conditions of the past against which current
trends must be compared, but also the trajectories must be
considered. This implies a requirement for much greater
richness in historical data. If not all possible paths for the
spread of infection have occurred within the period for
which historical records are used for comparison, these
methods may be unable to classify an outbreak simply
because the trajectory of increased incidence is unfamiliar.
Naturally, the number of different possible trajectories is
much larger than the number of different current threshold
scenarios, requiring a much longer and richer historical data
set before a meaningful baseline can be set than would be
required to detect outbreaks were all trajectories naturally
identical. Hybrid systems, separately using both current
threshold violations and adaptive trajectory responses, have
solved some of these problems. (For example, when shifts
in health-care utilization during epidemics and major
public events are expected, an integrated network model of
epidemiological data streams might have the potential to
improve localized outbreak detection.
9)
However, the definition of an outbreak is not the only
major stumbling block to implementing a practical biosur-
veillance system to support the efforts of public health
officials. Even if we assume that, for each disease, we have a
very good definition of what constitutes normal, endemic
levels and what should constitute an outbreak worthy of our
attention, various incredibly complex challenges remain.
This brings us to our second challenge: heterogeneity in the
sources of data. Diversity in incoming data provides a
multifaceted source of information, and also challenges
any system by providing variation in the timing and scale of
reported incoming values. For example, daily, weekly, and
monthly counts of cases may be reported as signals of the
same disease, covering the same population. As we develop
truly multifaceted sources of input into detection systems,
involving data from such varied sources as medication sales,
hospital admissions, doctors visits, web queries, and school
or office absenteeism, integrating signals requires compensa-
tion for the existence of single cases contributing to multiple
signals, not always simultaneously. Furthermore, not all of
these signals will have equal significance to outbreak
detection, nor is it reasonable to expect that actual incidence
of infection will be the only factor affecting their dynamics.
Finally, even if the difficulties in defining an outbreak and
integrating and appropriately weighing the various sources
of incoming surveillance data can be overcome, there still
remains our third challenge: timely detection of outbreaks.
Different diseases will require different lead times in order to
allow officials to mount effective and appropriate public
health response measures. However, common to all possible
outbreaks is the desire for reliable outbreak detection as early
as can be managed. Naturally, making the system reliable is
one of the key constraints against providing the earliest
possible warning of a coming problem. A system that
routinely issues false alarms is potentially even more harmful
than a system that fails to notice an outbreak until it is
already past its epidemic peak. Finding an appropriate
balance between sensitivity and specificity is the last great
challenge to the creation of effective measures in outbreak
detection.
Overview of traditional and upcoming data
sources and data streams
Worldwide disease surveillance systems are historically
supported by a reliable network of hospitals, outpatient
clinics, and diagnostic facilities, and are operated in
cooperation with local and regional public health institu-
tions. Overall, the established infrastructure facilitates con-
sistent improvement in data quality, essential for reliable
monitoring of well-controlled diseases. Most data-monitor-
ing systems that form the basis for many national surveil-
lance programmes strive to ensure a complete and
comprehensive coverage of the general population. Typi-
cally, medical and social care facilities, diagnostic services
networks, schools, universities, workplaces, and correctional
facilities constitute the core of data sources for universal data
repositories (see Table 1 for more examples). Their ability to
reflect how an outbreak progresses varies substantially with
different data sources, and the selection of a single source to
provide reliable early outbreak detection is problematic. For
example, highly specialized and disease-oriented systems are
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high-quality data on pathogen specifications by using
molecular genetic typing.
10 However, such systems might
not be flexible enough to track a novel pathogen or to collect
and process new information associated with an outbreak in
a timely manner and at reasonable cost. On the other hand,
systems focusing on a search for an aberration in ‘noisy’
environments, for example, syndromic surveillance, might
detect a change at an appropriate time, but fail to specify
the cause.
11
Each data source provides one or more data streams that
differ by a number of characteristics important for early
outbreak detection. Efforts to better understand the magni-
tude and severity of emerging and reemerging health threats
force the search for various proxies to diseases. A rapid
incorporation of novel data streams into disease surveillance
systems has demonstrated the potential of an increasing
information exchange.
12–15 The list of prospective candi-
dates for disease monitoring is growing and includes not
only traditional hospitalization records and laboratory-
confirmed tests but also the data streams driven by novel
information technologies. Personal digital assistant-based
records collected directly from an outbreak investigation,
16
hits and queries targeting specific websites (http://www.
google.org/flutrends/),
17 satellite imagery,
18 and searches for
media and news items are examples of these new data
streams (http://www.healthmap.org/about.php).
The inadequacy of existing infrastructure to provide early
warning even with a combination of standard and new
health measures is a problem that cannot be easily resolved.
A blend of new and traditional data streams offers a wide
range of measurable health and disease outcomes with
highly desirable characteristics in specificity; however, the
breadth and diversity of new measures and their composites
come with the price of presenting new challenges in data
processing. Each additional data stream has its own char-
acteristics, including timing, sensitivity and specificity,
accuracy, population coverage, and overlap with other
sources. Data streams that originate from various sources
might have differences in their properties, for example, a
different pattern of delays, population coverage, weekly or
seasonal cycles. The dynamics observed in these streams
have to be carefully evaluated, and their interpretation
might depend on our knowledge of the participating
population (for example, monitoring disjoint portions of
the same population might provide seemingly contrary
results). With an increase in the diversity of prospective
disease markers and a relative ease in collecting such
information electronically through blogs, mailing lists,
feeds, and queries,
19 a diligent control for data quality and
trustworthiness has to be established. In fact, these systems
are likely to be sensitive to factors that modify human
behaviour but are unrelated to true disease incidence.
Unconfirmed data streams can be prone to false alarms
because of our limited knowledge on proper signal cali-
brations.
20 To understand the interrelationship among
various data streams and data sources, it is essential to have
an automated support system with auxiliary information
related to the population at risk and to spatio-temporal
patterns of disease spread. Such information might
include demographic profiles and dynamics, population
migration and travel patterns, vaccination coverage and herd
immunity, calendar of social activities and anticipated
mass gatherings. Availability of this information can contri-
bute to the ability to detect an imminent outbreak early
(see Table 1 for more examples).
Overview of modern and cutting-edge methods
Every outbreak is initiated by the introduction of a pathogen
to a susceptible population, and represents a unique
sequence of elementary events in time and space forming a
unique signature, which depends on a multitude of factors.
Each outbreak can be characterized by the duration,
magnitude, and shape of an epidemic curve. Early detection
implies that it is possible to detect a change at the initial
stages of an outbreak as it progresses; in other words, to
Table 1 Examples of data sources, streams, curators, and supplementary information supporting surveillance systems
Data sources Data streams Data curators Auxiliary data
Medical care facilities (hospitals,
health-care and rehabilitation centres,
ambulatory clinics, drug dispensaries)
Diagnostic testing facilities
(laboratories, mobile diagnostic units)
Social-care facilities (day care centres,
assisted living and nursing homes,
hospice services)
Correctional facilities (jails, prisons)
Schools
Work places
Locations of intentional screening
Death records
Chief complains for emergency
room visits
Medical service and equipment use
records
Prescription records
Insurance claims
Laboratory tests
Pharmaceutical sale
records
Absenteeism reports
Hotline calls
PDA records
Website queries
Media news clips
Forensic records
Public health institutions
Local and regional
departments of vital statistics
National health statistics
institutions
Insurance industry
Pharmaceutical industry
Governmental and non-
governmental organizations
Academic institutions
Demographic profiles
Vaccination coverage records
Calendars of social activities
Environmental samples
Population migration and
displacement patterns
Land use, climate, and
meteorological information
Domestic animals and wildlife
surveillance data
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address this task can be framed as detection of aberrations at
various temporal or spatial or spatio-temporal scales.
The detection of aberrationsFchanges in the current
disease distribution as compared with historical or baseline
information that may include trend, impulse, spike, and step
shiftsFis based on understanding and on the ability to
measure the signal-to-noise ratio, where noise represents an
underlying trend and a ‘signal’ reflects an outbreak signa-
ture. In analyses of time series data, representing both noise
and a signal, or a composition of a baseline endemic level
with embedded epidemic curve, the use of moving averages,
adaptive thresholds, cumulative sums, etc. aims to separate a
noise from a signal by removing underlying trends of a
presumably ‘known form’. For example, in fitting a harmo-
nic regression to a time series of disease counts with
well-pronounced seasonal oscillations,
21,22 it is assumed that
a trajectory can be approximated by a periodic cosine
function. Thus, the removal of underlying trends can be
advantageous in removing expectations based on preexisting
knowledge, and can also be misleading if the ‘known form’ is
chosen incorrectly. In reality, the rationale for the removal of
expectation might be questionable: just because we expect
a specific pattern does not mean our algorithms should
not detect it as an aberration or an outbreak. We may be
compromising our algorithms’ sensitivity arbitrarily, when
instead we should be using human decision making to
complement the system, and know when to adjust for or
throw away an ‘expected pattern’. This is similar to decision
making in expert-assisted reading of imagery, pattern
recognition, and interpretation in medical diagnostics, or
object identification in security screening (for example, see
Levy and Valleron
23).
Early detection implies an ability to shorten notification
time for an outbreak before extensive damage is done. The
more rapid the detection goals, the shorter the temporal
scale of data collection and reporting required to support
those goals. This implies that weekly or daily data itself may
soon be insufficient for desired detection and response,
requiring instead hourly reporting. In replacing the surveil-
lance standard of weekly reporting with a shorter response
time, a wide range of factors have to be taken into account.
Dealing with daily reporting requires an understanding
of the effects that the day of the week, scheduled social
activities, and holidays might have on the expected
temporal pattern. For example, depending on the type of
hospital admissionFemergency, in-patient, or outpatient
careFthe effect of the day of the week on baseline disease
patterns can be different. Thus, an analysis of in-patient and
outpatient data streams has to be supplemented with an
assessment of timing for provisional updates, population
mobility, instantaneous effects of the media on seeking
medical care behavioural patterns, etc.
Many existing and widely implemented analytical
methods for assessing temporal trends, seasonal patterns,
and non-periodic aberrations are based on historical records:
the longer the monitoring is in place, the faster an unusual
pattern can be detected.
24,25 For example, diseases that are
relatively frequently observed and have a long and well-
established history of monitoring, such as illness caused by
Salmonella and Campylobacter bacteria, are good candidates
for traditional detection techniques that use historical limits
methods or moving-window methods.
26 In such situations,
traditional approaches are appropriate and can produce
reliable predictions. However, the detection of events that
are rare or have never been observed poses a challenge for
model specification. Most existing models rely on a gradual
change in numbers of observed events and are not adapted
for data exhibiting a sudden spike in case numbers at an
unexpected point in time.
27 The nature of emerging health
threats requires more sophisticated methods that are sensi-
tive to rapid change and capable of taking into account
specific features of an anticipated outbreak (for example, see
Martinez-Beneito et al.
28).
The ability to recognize clusters of events of public health
concern adds a valuable dimension to early outbreak
detection. New methods that enable spatial scanning for
potential clusters that are well tailored to the effective
detection of localized events are ready for integration into
surveillance systems.
29 The practical implementation of
these methods boosts the demand for better-quality geo-
referenced data on events of interest.
30,31 Where did an
exposure occur? Where did symptoms first manifest?
Where was health care provided? How were these important
spatial identifiers collected, stored, shared, and interpreted?
Answers to these questions have become increasingly
important. In many surveillance systems, the location of
a patient’s residence is often used as a proxy for exposure
and transmission, which is often a wrong assumption. In
instances in which detailed geo-referenced information is
available, traditional analytical tools have a limited capacity
to use such information effectively, as many of them were
developed before complex interlinked geographical informa-
tion could be routinely collected. New methods have to take
into consideration non-euclidean topologies of an outbreak
signature. Such topologies are very likely to be observed in
spatio-temporal patterns of disease when transmission is
amplified by transit, for example, in air travel connecting
hubs at non-geographically adjacent places. Complex spatial
patterns of geo-referenced exposure–transmission–detection
pathways have to be better understood to guide the design of
adaptive surveillance systems. Novel techniques such as
dynamic mapping,
32 multivariate visualization, flow map-
ping,
33,34 outbreak signature forecasting,
35,36 and large-scale
simulations of infection spread
37–39 have the potential to
shed light on the complexity of spatial disease clustering.
Ideas for the future
Although there is a plethora of opportunities to expand
and refine existing methods, and to develop new ones in
completely novel directions as yet unconsidered, we believe
that the future of outbreak detection will (at least in the
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(see Figure 1).
Redefining the goal of an outbreak detection system
Although the traditional meaning of ‘outbreak detection’
involves only the detection of incipient ‘greater than
normal’ disease incidence, we believe that it may prove
vastly important to redefine our target for detection.
40
Recent advances in the science of risk assessment (We refer
the readers to two prominent targeted journals in the field:
International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management
(http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalCODE¼
ijram) and Risk Analysis (http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.
asp?ref¼0272-4332), which cover various issues of risk
detection.) have led to the understanding that compre-
hensive plans to ensure public safety are the result of
characterizing both the probability of an event and the
severity of the outcome should the event occur. We propose
that there may be benefit in adapting this insight to the field
of biosurveillance.
This perspective provides two possible paths for
fine-tuning our surveillance efforts: (a) likelihood of event:
It may be that particular outbreaks are always introduced
through the same pathways. In that case, we may benefit
by enhancing the sensitivity of our surveillance in areas
in which we know these pathways exist (for example, it
may make sense to monitor regions with particular native
animals for certain zoonotic infections more closely); and
(b) potential result: It may be that we would benefit
by focusing on particular populations (for example, the
immunocompromised or elderly) for which there is
heightened concern based on a lack of herd immunity, the
Figure 1 The schematic view of early outbreak detection.
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compromising characteristics. This perspective has been
already incorporated into public health planning, but has
not yet been incorporated directly into surveillance methods.
However, more intriguingly, we can push this idea even
further by sliding the sensitivity of our outbreak detection
algorithms to reflect areas in which we believe that curtailing
an outbreak may be most effective if we identify it sufficiently
rapidly. This may even come at the expense of sensitivity in
areas in which we understand that we will never have enough
advanced warning to effectively alter the course of an
epidemic, and could lead to vastly different but more practical
and efficient systems. Rather than curtailing the transmission
of disease in certain areas, we may aim instead to improve the
capability of providing sufficient medical care for all those
affected (for example, surge capacity). The possibilities are vast
and unexplored. We believe that this more complex goal for
outbreak detection algorithms may lead to very different
surveillance systems from those already in use.
Expanding the richness of interface between
autonomous methods and analysts
Traditional tools of outbreak detection have been designed
to operate in two separate stagesFwith an automatic,
computational component in which red flags are raised in
the case of a coming outbreak, followed by a distinct human-
analyst component in which a person considers the
recommendation of the machine and responds by enacting
public health responses or dismissing the particular flag as
being of low priority or concern. However, we believe that
the most effective systems will integrate the input of
computational tools with that of human decision makers.
Autonomous components of a surveillance system could
constantly analyse and organize vast quantities of otherwise
overwhelming data, and present the results to a human
analyst in ways that may highlight possible anomalies,
allowing the analyst to decide which of these directions may
be most valuable to pursue. Novel methods for such tools are
currently under development within the newly rising field of
visual analytics (http://nvac.pnl.gov/, http://www.purdue.
edu/discoverypark/vaccine/research/vaat.php),
16,30 and we
eagerly anticipate further developments in these areas. We
believe that these methods will provide drastically more
effective tools for biosurveillance.
Expanding the roles of autonomous methods leading
to truly self-organizing systems for outbreak detection
Many of the complications inherent in determining an
a priori, human understanding-based definition of ‘outbreak’
may, in fact, be irrelevant. As with many fields of data
mining, we believe that there may be vast, untapped
potential in the idea of using historical data, not to set
thresholds (whether static or dynamic), the violation of
which would constitute an outbreak, but instead as training
data, that is, data used for sensitivity calibration by a
detection algorithm. By introducing concepts of machine
learning, it may be that we can allow software to decide
where the most useful signals of incipient outbreaks lie in
the available data. This can be carried out by providing only
the data and points in time during which human analysts
concluded ‘manually’ that outbreak conditions were present.
Using these methods may lead to surprising and counter-
intuitive definitions of an outbreak (perhaps having nothing
to do with any signal of understood biological relevance).
Yet, for practical purposes, it would be unlikely to matter, so
long as the detection algorithm arrived at by the autono-
mous system provided consistent, sensitive, specific warn-
ings of coming outbreaks.
Furthermore, the exploration of autonomous systems need
not lie only in the definition of an outbreak itself. As the
heterogeneity of data sources increases, it may be that a
similarly automated dynamic weighting method for assessing
the relative contribution to overall signal strength from each
data source could lead to a far more sophisticated and
sensitive system for outbreak detection. Again, along the
same lines, the underlying topology of data sources could be
autonomously explored, allowing clustering algorithms to be
applied over different configurations of both time and space.
These methods could reveal previously concealed travel
patterns, or mechanisms of contaminationFor even perhaps
cultural similarities that enable enhanced transmission of an
infectious agent. Each of these potentially critical facets,
contributing to the spread of infection, would need to be
understood and defined manually under the current detection
systems; however, by allowing dynamic methods of ongoing
machine learning to operate, we may be able to enhance our
ability to detect outbreaks while potentially furthering our
understanding of the contributing factors driving the disease
dynamics. A fully autonomous system, allowed to learn by
continual, dynamic exploration of the complete space of
incoming surveillance data, could be a prototype for a very
powerful self-organizing surveillance system. (For more
information on ‘self-organizing systems’, see Levin
41.)
Conclusion
We believe that modern advances in assembling data,
techniques for collating and processing information for mean-
ingful analysis, and technology to enable integrated analysis
and surveillance will support a new paradigm in outbreak
definition and detection. We anticipate that these perspectives
will provide the highly desired sensitivity and specificity in
early detection required by the emerging challenges of global
disease surveillance. Although foundational research in these
areas is already underway, now that data access and computa-
tional power are improving, we believe that the next five to
10 years will be very exciting as these systems are implemented
and brought to fruition for practical use.
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